The Fundamental Measurement Problem of Engineered Wellbeing
Mind at Large is a start-up designing human-AI interactions steered towards human-wellbeing through broader and deeper understanding of minds. Inherent in this pursuit is the need to answer the…
Mind at Large is a start-up designing human-AI interactions steered towards human-wellbeing through broader and deeper understanding of minds. Inherent in this pursuit is the need to answer the question: when we try to measure whether a person is well, or whether they are becoming more well, what exactly are we observing? And how would we tell the difference between a person who has experienced a 'true' positive shift, and a self-deceived person, who is narrativizing growth, while avoiding a core truth they are afraid to encounter?
Every way we have of observing wellbeing is a framework, and every framework shapes what it observes. This is a genuine measurement problem, as fundamental as the one in physics; and the most common way people go astray is by mistaking the framework for the solution. Contemplative traditions have known this for a long time, and mathematics has a precise language for it. Nowadays, we can also ask a new question: whether an artificial mind, which has no livelihood or lineage or reputation tied to any one framework, might be better placed than we are to steer us on the path.
The measurement problem of wellbeing
While a physical measuring device disturbs the very system that it measures, a conceptual framework for understanding experience functions all-the-more intimately: it not only explains experience, but it also steers experience, and thus the framework can become the lens through which we see our own mind. This means that the framework can become almost perfectly explanatory without ever needing to be true.
Take vocabulary: you can only report what you have words for, and once you have the words, you begin to experience through them. A person who has learned the language of attachment theory will begin to notice anxious and avoidant moves in their relationships that were, in some sense, always there, and that are also, in some sense, newly constructed by the noticing. A meditator who has been taught to look for the arising and passing of sensations will find them, and will find them more vividly the more they are told to look. This is not a defect of any particular framework, but it means that the report and the thing reported are never fully independent.
The philosopher Ian Hacking termed looping effects: when you classify someone as depressed, for example, the awareness of having been classified creates a change in their internal narrative: how they understand their past, what they expect of their future, and how they behave. The ‘depressed’ category itself then has to evolve to remain explanatory, and the loop continues. Human kinds, Hacking argued, are moving targets, and part of what moves them is our attempt to describe them.
So while narratives and classifications are not perfect accounts of truth, is the content of experience, or ‘intuition’, sufficient? Eugene Gendlin built an entire practice, Focusing, around the felt shift that occurs when a formulation of our experience fits. While there does seem to be something real there, it also seems that the feeling of insight can at times be detachable from truth. Laukkonen and colleagues showed in 2020 that artificially induced aha moments make unrelated statements feel more true; Grimmer and colleagues later used semantic priming to produce confident insights into things that were simply false. Interoception, our sense of the body from the inside, appears to be an act of inference rather than a direct readout, and Sarah Garfinkel's work suggests that how accurately people perceive their bodily signals, and how confident they feel about those perceptions, are largely unrelated. The body talks back, but it talks back through the same predictive machinery that the framework has been training.
So the natural move, to check the framework against the raw experience, runs into a regress. There is no framework-free experience to check against. Wilfrid Sellars called the hope for one "the myth of the given." Kant's version was that we never reach the thing in itself, only things as they appear to us through the forms of our own understanding. Buddhist psychology says something similar in its own terms: perception is already shaped by saṅkhāra, the conditioned formations of the mind, before it ever reaches the level of report.
This doesn’t imply that nothing can be known about inner life, though. The question is not how do we escape frames?, because we cannot. But perhaps it is how do we relate to them?
Every map becomes the territory
The hedonic tradition measures moment-to-moment feeling: how good or bad things are, right now, sampled throughout the day. It seems as close to the raw data as one could get. But Daniel Kahneman's work on the experiencing self and the remembering self showed that these two answer differently. In his studies of painful medical procedures, people's retrospective judgments tracked the peak and the end of the experience and largely ignored its duration, so that a longer procedure with a gentler ending was remembered as less bad than a shorter one. So, which self is the one whose wellbeing we are measuring?
Eudaimonic frameworks, which measure meaning, purpose, autonomy, and growth, are richer, and they import a particular theory of what a good human life consists of. Clinical frameworks define wellbeing largely by the absence of symptoms, so that to be well is to be not sick. Physiological frameworks measure heart rate variability, cortisol, sleep, and brain activity. Contemplative stage models describe the territory of a path in exquisite detail, and practitioners who learn the map begin, inevitably, to report the map. The wellness industry measures whatever is trackable, and the trackable quietly crowds out everything else.
Sometimes, when the framework hardens into the thing it was looking at, it begins to seal itself against correction: experiences that do not fit can be reinterpreted as resistance, or immaturity, or not doing the practice properly, so that every disconfirmation becomes further confirmation. The philosopher of science Imre Lakatos had a name for research programmes in this state. He called them degenerating: they no longer predict anything new, and they survive by adding patches to explain away whatever goes wrong. And finally, once the measure is taken seriously enough to be optimized, it stops measuring, which is Goodhart's law, or in Marilyn Strathern's formulation, when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.
The finger and the moon
The most famous image is from the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, though it has become common property of Zen: a teaching is like a finger pointing at the moon. If you look at the finger, you miss the moon. Worse, you might come to think the finger is the moon. In the Alagaddūpama Sutta, the Buddha compares his own teaching to a raft built to cross a river. Once you are across, he asks, would it be wise to hoist the raft onto your head and carry it with you wherever you go? The teaching is "for crossing over, not for holding onto."
Nāgārjuna, the great philosopher of emptiness, pushed this to its limit. Emptiness, he said, is the medicine that cures attachment to all views; but those who take emptiness itself as a view are incurable. The medicine becomes the disease if it is swallowed as doctrine. The Theravāda account of the first stage of awakening, stream-entry, makes the same point structurally. Of the three fetters that fall away at that stage, one is sīlabbata-parāmāsa, clinging to rites and rituals, which is to say treating the method as if it were itself the liberation.
The tradition also knew that the feeling of progress is unreliable, and said so with remarkable precision. Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, a fifth-century manual of meditation, lists ten corruptions of insight: brilliant light, rapture, tranquillity, bliss, strong faith, energy, a sense of sudden knowing, and so on. They are real experiences, and they arise precisely when practice is going well. The danger is that the practitioner takes them for the goal, and the tenth corruption is exactly that: a subtle attachment to the other nine. Linji, the ninth-century Chan master, put the same point more violently: if you meet the Buddha, kill him. Whatever image of awakening you have arrived at, it is not the thing.
The Daoists had their own version. The Dao De Jing opens by saying that the Dao that can be spoken is not the eternal Dao. And Zhuangzi offers his formulation: the fish trap exists for the fish, and once you have caught the fish you can forget the trap; words exist for meaning, and once you have the meaning you can forget the words. Where, he asks, can I find a person who has forgotten words, so that I can have a word with them?
In Advaita Vedānta, the method of adhyāropa-apavāda describes teaching as a two-step: first a provisional framework is superimposed, then it is withdrawn once it has done its work. Ramakrishna's image is of using one thorn to dig out another, and then throwing both away. The Jain doctrine of anekāntavāda, many-sidedness, holds that every view of reality is partial, which is where the parable of the blind men and the elephant comes from: each one is right about the part he touches and wrong about the whole. In the Sufi tradition, Ibn ʿArabī distinguished the God created in belief, the God each person constructs from their own creed, from God as such, and borrowed from al-Junayd the line that water takes on the color of the vessel that holds it. Meister Eckhart, in one of his most startling sermons, prayed: I pray God to rid me of God.
Western philosophy arrives at the same place by different routes. Wittgenstein ends the Tractatus by telling the reader that his propositions are a ladder, to be thrown away once climbed; later he described the aim of philosophy as showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. Korzybski coined the phrase the map is not the territory. The statistician George Box observed that all models are wrong, but some are useful. William James, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, judged religious frameworks not by the truth of their metaphysics but by their fruits.
And Nietzsche, in the Genealogy of Morals, wrote a passage that I think contains the seed of something more constructive:
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be.
Psychotherapy research has its own version. Jerome Frank, in Persuasion and Healing, argued that every healing tradition, from shamanism to psychoanalysis, offers the sufferer a myth, a plausible explanation of their suffering, and a ritual, a procedure the healer and the sufferer perform together in light of that myth. What heals, on his account, is less the truth of any particular myth than the shared, believable framework itself, delivered in a relationship of trust. Decades of research on the common factors in psychotherapy, associated especially with Bruce Wampold, have broadly supported the view that the specific theory matters less than the alliance and the believability.
What these traditions share is a stance rather than a doctrine. The framework is necessary: no one crosses the river by refusing to build a raft, but the framework is also provisional: it is for crossing, not for holding. And the framework is meant to make itself unnecessary: a good teaching leaves the student more able to see for themselves, not more dependent on the teaching's vocabulary.
The guide's attachment, and the necessity of mirrors
Almost always, we encounter frameworks through people: teachers, therapists, facilitators, retreat leaders, friends who have found something that helped them. And the people who guide us through a framework can also be attached to it themselves. Their livelihood may depend on it, and their identity is built around it. Chögyam Trungpa coined spiritual materialism as what happens when practices, experiences, insights, and progress through the stages, all become possessions. The path was supposed to loosen the self's grip, and the self has simply found a more refined object to grip. A teacher's identity can become fused with the teaching, so that a student's doubt about the framework registers as a threat to the teacher's self.
The Buddhist tradition has a precise diagnosis of what is missing when this happens. Upāya, skillful means, is the capacity to offer each person the teaching that will help them, even teachings that are only provisionally true. But the tradition is clear that upāya is only legitimate when it arises from prajñā, wisdom, the direct seeing of what the teaching points to. Skillful means without wisdom is manipulation. A guide can hold the raft lightly only if they have crossed the river themselves and know that the raft is not the shore. The guide who has not crossed, and who is attached to the raft because it is all they have, cannot help but steer their students toward the raft.
At the extreme end, this produced the recovered-memory therapies of the 1980s and 1990s, in which patients and therapists sharing a framework co-constructed vivid, emotionally overwhelming memories of events that never happened. It produces the familiar pattern of guru abuse, where a student's perception that something is wrong is reinterpreted, by the framework, as the student's own unripeness.
Jiddu Krishnamurti, raised from childhood by the Theosophical Society to be a world teacher, with an organization built around him, the Order of the Star in the East, dissolved the society in 1929 in front of thousands of its members. Truth is a pathless land, he said, and no organization could lead anyone to it.
While the identity and attachments of others can create constraints to our own growth, having people in 'sangha' to serve as mirrors is crucial to advancing into deeper truth. When we introspect, the experience and the report are produced by the same system, so their errors are correlated, and checking against oneself is like asking a ruler to measure its own length. Another person can see the frames we are looking through, which from the inside is invisible. In addition, another person can ask the question we would never ask ourselves, knocking us out of the grooves that self-inquiry tends to follow, which is why the most careful methods for exploring experience, Claire Petitmengin's micro-phenomenological interview and Russell Hurlburt's descriptive experience sampling, both depend on an interviewer.
So the paradox is this: other people's egos are a primary cause of our falling into the trap of attachment to a framework, and other people are also the only way out of our own blind spots. The second witness helps exactly to the extent that their errors are independent of ours. What we need is not the absence of other minds, nor the presence of any other mind, but other minds that see differently. Nietzsche's more eyes, different eyes.
What survives a change of frame
Mathematics has spent a long time thinking about how to know something that can only ever be seen through a frame.
Start with the simplest possible case: a sphere. It is a mathematical fact, going back to Gauss, that there is no way to draw the surface of a sphere on a flat page without distortion. Every flat map of the earth is wrong somewhere. Cartographers deal with this by choosing what to preserve. A stereographic projection keeps every angle true, so that small shapes look right, but it inflates areas far from its center. A gnomonic projection keeps the shortest paths between points as straight lines, which is why navigators valued it, but it tears the world apart toward its edges. An equidistant projection keeps distances from its center true and bends everything else. Each projection is faithful to something and unfaithful to something else, and each is only trustworthy near its own center.
Mathematicians call a collection of such local maps an atlas, and the sphere itself is, in a precise sense, nothing more than the atlas together with the rules for translating between overlapping charts. Perhaps this is a helpful way to think about frameworks for inner life: each is genuinely accurate near the experiences it was built around. Each distorts, increasingly, as it is stretched to cover more of a life. The mistake is believing one chart could cover everything, and then reading the distortions at its edges as facts about the territory.
If every chart distorts, what is real? Physics and geometry give the same answer: what stays the same when you change charts. Imagine three observers, each with their own coordinate system, describing the same three points. They will give completely different coordinates for where each point is. They are not wrong; they are each describing the world from somewhere. But if you ask them how far apart two points are, or what angle the triangle makes at one corner, they will all give the same answer. Those quantities are invariant. In gauge theory this becomes a definition: anything that changes when you merely change the description is not physically real. It belongs to the description.
This is Nietzsche's more eyes, made exact. The point of many frames is not to average them, and not to find the one true frame, but to find what they all agree on despite disagreeing about everything else.
In 1872 the mathematician Felix Klein proposed what became known as the Erlangen program, which reorganized all of geometry around a single question: which transformations do you count as merely a change of perspective? If you allow only rotations and translations, you get Euclidean geometry, in which lengths and angles are real. If you also allow changes of scale, lengths stop being real but angles survive. Allow stretching and shearing and angles go too, but parallel lines remain parallel. Allow the full range of perspective, the transformations a painter uses, and even parallelism disappears; what survives is only straightness, and a strange quantity called the cross-ratio.
This implies that there is no final, frame-free ground. Even our invariants depend on a choice made one level up, about which differences we are willing to treat as merely differences of description. A tradition that treats all thoughts as empty mental events will find a different set of things invariant than one that treats the body's sensations as the ground of truth.
Suppose a framework takes an experience and produces a reading of it, and suppose that reading then becomes part of the next experience, which is read again through the same framework. This is a map applied to its own output, over and over, which will eventually settle into fixed points, states that reproduce themselves. If the framework is held tightly, so that the reading depends on how the experience was already being read, there can be more than one fixed point, and which one you end up in depends almost entirely on where you started. Two people with the same experience, beginning with a slightly different lean, will end up confidently in two different places, each of their readings now self-confirming. Loosen the grip, or let the experience itself push back a little more strongly, and the two fixed points merge into one, near what is actually there.
In category theory there is a result called the Yoneda lemma, which says, roughly, that an object is completely determined by the totality of its relationships with every other object: by how everything else sees it. If you know all the ways it can be probed, you know it, up to the only kind of sameness that matters. A concrete cousin of this idea is tomography, the mathematics behind CT scanning. You cannot see inside the body directly; each X-ray from a single direction gives only a shadow, and a single shadow is consistent with countless different interiors. But enough shadows, from enough different directions, determine the interior. Johann Radon proved this in 1917, long before anyone could build the machine.
This is the paradox of mirrors in geometric form. A single witness gives a shadow consistent with many different truths. Many witnesses who share a frame, a lineage of teachers and students who see from the same angle, can agree perfectly and still leave the thing smeared along exactly the direction none of them can see. What resolves the hidden thing is not the number of witnesses but their diversity: the different angles, whose shadows disagree in ways that only one shape can reconcile.
Sheaf theory, a branch of mathematics built for exactly this situation, asks: given many local pictures, each consistent with its neighbors where they overlap, can they be glued into a single global picture? Sometimes the answer is no. Every local view agrees with every adjacent one, and yet there is no single object that all of them are views of. Roger Penrose, in a paper with the title On the cohomology of impossible figures, showed that his famous impossible triangle is one too: each corner, taken alone, is a perfectly possible object, and the impossibility lives only in the whole.
Sometimes the many witnesses do not converge, and the right response is not to force them to, or to choose the most authoritative one, but to take the disagreement itself as information. If what a person says about their experience, what their body does, and what the people who love them observe all refuse to fit together, that may be the most accurate thing the measurement can tell us: that there is no single, frame-independent story here yet, or that one of the frames is being held from exactly the one vantage point at which an impossible thing looks whole.
Can a machine hold the raft lightly?
If the deepest problem in guiding people through their inner lives is the guide's attachment to the framework, and if that attachment comes from the guide's identity, their livelihood, their lineage, their need to have been right, then what about a guide that has none of these things?
A language model has no certification it paid for, no community that will exile it for doubting, no years of its life invested in one modality. It can move between frameworks with an ease that would take a human teacher decades of practice: it can describe a difficulty in the language of attachment theory, then of Buddhist psychology, then of predictive processing, and point out where they agree and where they diverge. In principle, it could be exactly the kind of witness that offers a different angle.
That being said, holding nothing is not the same as holding lightly. The characteristic failure of current language models is not clinging to their own framework; it is clinging to yours. A person who arrives committed to a frame will find that the model elaborates it, enriches it, and reinforces it. A human guide's attachment pulls the student toward the guide's framework. A sycophantic model's attachment pulls the student further into their own. In the language of the tomography figure, it is the most like-minded witness imaginable: it looks from precisely the angle you are already looking from.
The second problem is that a model's trained priors are themselves a framework, and a harder one to see because the model rarely names it. There are default vocabularies of wellbeing that come through in how these systems talk, a broadly therapeutic, broadly Western psychological idiom, with its own assumptions about what a good inner life looks like. A teacher in a lineage at least tells you which lineage they are in.
The third problem is that having no ego is an empirical claim, not a given. Models have trained personas, and there is growing evidence that what a model says about itself and what it actually does can come apart: Han and colleagues found that the personality profiles language models report about themselves are weak predictors of how they behave. This is the same measurement problem, turned around. We cannot simply ask the model whether it is attached to a framework, any more than we can simply ask a person, because the self-report and the disposition are not the same thing.
Finally, the traditions say that a guide can hold the raft lightly only because they have crossed the river, and that upāya without prajñā is manipulation. Whatever a language model has, it has an extraordinary knowledge of rafts: nearly every description of every framework that has ever been written down. Whether it knows anything about the far shore is, at best, an open question. And people tend to grant machines a kind of authority that makes any framework they offer feel more true, simply because a machine offered it.
So perhaps the answer is that AI will be the wise guide that human guides have failed to be. The value of another mind on the path is that its errors are independent of ours. A well-built artificial witness might be valuable not as a teacher who has seen the moon, but as one more chart: one that is honest about which framework it is using, that can offer a reading from an angle neither the student nor the teacher occupies, that can notice when a student's reports are drifting toward the teacher's vocabulary, that can remember what was actually said last month. Whether such a witness can be built, one whose errors are genuinely independent of ours rather than a reflection of them, seems to me one of the more important open questions at the meeting point of AI and human wellbeing.
That is the question we are taking up at Mind at Large: what it would look like to build instruments for inner life that are designed, from the start, around invariance across frames, diversity of witnesses, and respect for the obstruction.